SECURING DATA USING FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION  SCHEMES OVER CLOUD COMPUTING by V. Satish Kumar & V.Trilik Kumar
COMPUSOFT, An international journal of advanced computer technology, 3 (10), October-2014 (Volume-III, Issue-X) 
1157 
 
 
SECURING DATA USING FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
SCHEMES OVER CLOUD COMPUTING 
V. Satish Kumar
1, V.Trilik Kumar
2   
1Student, Computer Science & Engineering Dept., Dr. KVSR Institute of Technology, Andhra Pradesh, INDIA 
 2Assoc. Professor, Information Technology Dept., Dr. KVSR Institute of Technology, Andhra Pradesh, INDIA 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: There is a problem for business organizations to move towards cloud computing regarding the safety and security issues 
associated with cloud computing. Different technologies have been used to relate these types of issues including various control 
methods and cryptographic techniques. When the data transmitted to the Cloud we use standard encryption methods to secure the 
operations and the storage of the data.  Fully homomorphic encryption has cloud computing is to perform computations on 
encrypted data without previous decryption. The first fully homomorphic schemes have been proposed and developed to improve 
the performance, reduce the complexity and the cost of the scheme. Mainly two important schemes are refreshed and discussed in 
this paper. The first scheme discoursed in this paper is “Encryption over Integers using fully Homomorphism”. The second one is 
about “Encryption without Bootstrapping by using fully Homomorphism”. These two are basically concentrated on the security, 
performance and complexity factors of the mentioned schemes. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
   The  distributed  systems  and  especially  cloud 
computing are developing according to the technology. The 
organization has benefits through information sharing and 
the  greater  degree  of  flexibility  in  scaling  resources  has 
pushed the cloud into mainstream computing. 
  
          However,  the  cloud  comes  into  most  information 
security problems from traditional computing domains. With 
this,  the  distributed  nature  of  the  cloud  alters  many  new 
types of problems. There are several major problems that the 
cloud faces:  
 
  The  cloud  may  not  be  trusted.  The  cloud  service 
provider  (CSP)  is not  necessarily  trusted.  For  example,  a 
malicious  company  employee  may  be  able  to  setup  back 
doors  and  circumferential  all  the  protection  over  the 
company cloud services. In addition, some systems in the 
cloud may be mismanaged, making them tender to attacks. 
Even further, some machines may belong to intruders.  
  Implementation of bugs can be overworked.  Even if 
the  Cloud  Service  Providers  are  trusted  and  they  provide 
easy  mechanisms  such  as  sandboxing  and  virtualization. 
Bugs  in  the  machine  are  declared  every  day,  may  be 
exploited  to  circumvent  any  protection,  e.g.  [1].  As  an 
example, in [2] the authors show that an attacker could take 
control  of  the  VMware  and  Xen  virtualization  software 
when moving a virtual machine from one physical computer 
to another. 
  Side channel attacks can bypass security. Although 
the system is fully protected and the code is executing in a 
confidential  platform,  the  side  channel  attacks  may  still 
compromise the security. For example, an attacker using the 
cold boot attack [3] is able to retrieve sensitive data from the 
unrepressed DRAM after using a cold reboot to restart the 
machine. An intruder using the Branch prediction attacks [4] 
can gather information about the encryption keys by simply 
monitoring the system time. These types of attacks typically 
require physical access to the systems, which is not an easy 
way to perform. However it is possible that your code will 
be  executed  in  a  system  belongs  to  the  intruder  in  cloud 
computing settings. In such cases, the intruder will be able 
to gain active access to the system easily. 
 
2.  BACK GROUND 
2.1 Homomorphic Encryption Schemes: 
The development of homomorphic encryption provides yet 
another  distinct  approach  to  build  SFE  protocols. 
Conversationally, a homomorphic encryption scheme allows 
computation directly on encrypted data. It is easy to build 
the SFE protocol freely by using Homomorphic Encryption. 
Alice send the input x in the form of cipher texts to Bob. 
Bob will calculate f(x) directly on the cipher text which the 
Alice was sent and get back the encrypted result. And that 
result was decrypt only by Alice. As long as the security of 
the homomorphic encryption scheme holds, Bob will not be 
able to learn anything about x. The Homomorphic properties 
of public key encryption schemes, e.g. RSA and ElGamal 
encryption,  were  accepted.  However  they  were  largely 
viewed as a weakness rather than a plus. Applications where 
data  is  inactive  typically  require  uninfluenced  encryption. 
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However, the community of people has grown to believe the 
confidentiality of these schemes and recently, the work of 
Gentry  and  others  exhibit  that,  when  carefully  employed, 
such homomorphic properties can be quite useful. Indeed, a 
number  of  recent  specific  applications  such  as  data 
aggregation in distributed networks, electronic voting, and 
biometrics and Financial transactions. 
 
 
 
Fig - 1 : Homomorphic encryption scheme 
 
Restriction  of  Partial  HE  Scheme:  Without  any  doubt, 
partial HE schemes are valuable in certain applications. In 
accession,  for  particular  applications  some  partial  HE 
schemes are very adequate regarding the efficiency. E.g. the 
Paillier  scheme  can  execute  ratings  in  milliseconds  level. 
Yet, the loopholes of this category of schemes are also clear. 
 
       The main problem of the partial HE schemes is the 
range of the circuits that they provide. Almost partial HE 
schemes only support one kind of process, e.g. additions for 
Paillier  and multiplications  for  RSA.  This  draws  a heavy 
restriction on the circuits that the HE schemes can evaluate 
homomorphically. Some partial HE schemes supports more 
than  one  process,  however,  limitations  even  survive.  The 
Boneh-Goh-Nissim  scheme  supports  one  level  of 
multiplications via bilinear maps. The characteristic of this 
scheme make changes by measuring 2-DNF expressions and 
which  may  not  be  measured  by  using  single-operation 
partial  HE  schemes.  However,  only  one  level  of 
multiplication  operation  is  supported.  The  Boneh-Goh-
Nissim scheme cannot hold additional difficult circuits. 
Somewhat  Homomorphic  Encryption  Scheme:  FHE 
schemes without freeing the disturbance can also be utilized 
as  partial  HE  schemes. These  schemes  commonly  have  a 
large  number  of  additions  and  bounded  levels  of 
multiplications. With this property HE schemes are usually 
referred  as  Somewhat  Homomorphic  Encryption  Schemes 
(SWHE).  Although  this  type  of  partial  HE  schemes  can 
support  much  more  complicated  circuits  than  the  single-
operation  ones,  it  is  even  hardly  limited  because  the 
restrictions  on  levels  of  multiplications  will  finally  be 
achieved.  Only  some  partial  HE  schemes  have  additional 
constrictions that keep them from existing applied only for 
exceptional  applications.  For  example,  the  Boneh-Goh-
Nissim  scheme  needs  a  small  message  length  to  reach 
responsive  decryption  ratio,  which  enforces  additional 
restriction to the scheme. 
 
2.2  GENTRY’S  Fully  Homomorphic  Encryption 
Schemes 
The  idea  of  fully  homomorphic  encryption  was raised  by 
Rivest,  Adleman  and  Dertouzos  [7],  shortly  after  the 
invention  of  RSA  [8].  A  fully  homomorphic  encryption 
scheme consists of following four algorithms: 
 
 KeyGen (λ) - Generates the encryption keys. As an input, 
it exacts λ for the security parameter and generates the 
secret key sk and the public key pk.  
 Enc (pk, m) – Encrypts the plaintext m with the public 
key pk to create ciphertext c.  
 Dec (sk,c) – Decrypts the ciphertext c using the secret key 
sk to retrieve the plaintext m.  
 Eval  (pk,C,c1,c2  …  ct)  -  Uses  a  Boolean  circuit  C  to 
outputs a ciphertext of f(m) such that Decrypt (sk, m) = 
f(m).  
 
     Gentry’s construction consists of three main elements: a 
somewhat  homomorphic  encryption  scheme  that  can 
evaluate low degree polynomials, a technique to “squash the 
decryption  circuit”  to  get  a  “bootstrappable”  scheme  and 
finally a method of transferring “bootstrapping” the scheme 
into fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The significant 
point in this process is to obtain a scheme that can evaluate 
high degree polynomials while the decryption procedure can 
still  be  expressed  as  low  degree  polynomial.  Once  the 
scheme  can  evaluate  its  own  decryption  function  plus  an 
additional  operation  then  it  is  called  “bootstrappable” 
scheme  and  can  be  converted  into  a  fully  homomorphic 
scheme.  
 
     Although  Gentry  scheme  proved  the  possibility  of 
implementing  fully  homomorphic  encryption,  the  scheme 
complexity,  efficiency  and  performance  needed  to  be 
improved. For example Gentry has estimated that building a 
circuit  to  execute  an  encrypted  Google  search  with 
encrypted keywords would multiply the current computing 
time by one trillion. However the scheme has cheered many 
researchers to suggest many  forms to Gentry’s scheme to 
better  the  performance  and  lighten  the  complexity  and 
ciphertext  length.  Two  interesting  approaches  were 
discussed in the following sections. 
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3. DIFFERENTIATING 
       In  this  part  we  compare  and  analyze  Dijk’s  and 
Brakerski’s  schemes  for  the  security,  efficiency  and 
complexity factors.  
 
A. Encryption over Integers using Fully Homomorphism  
 
Security:  The  security  of  this  scheme  is  based  on  the 
hardness of the approximate-gcd problem. With appropriate 
selection  of  parameters  the  scheme  has  proved  to  resist 
different types of attacks to recover the secret key including 
brute-force  attack  with  atleast  2λ  time.  Nevertheless  by 
using lattice reduction algorithm, it has been examine that 
the scheme can be attacked to retrieve the plaintext from 
ciphertext. The parameters settings which have been used in 
the attack were considered to be appropriate by the Dijk’s 
scheme.  
Performance: The noise factor grows large when addition 
and multiplication operations are performed, it doubles on 
addition  and  squares  on  multiplication.  By  multiplying 
ciphertexts  yields  a  noise  factor  with  a  size  equals  ~2dn 
where  n  is  the  number  of  performances.  The  ciphertext 
original message cannot be amended, if the noise factor gets 
higher than q/2. On the other hand, in order to better the 
security of the scheme the cipher text was choose to have a 
prominent  value  n6,  this  value  gain  with  multiplication 
which also outcomes on degraded efficiency. 
Complexity: Reducing the Gentry’s scheme complexity was 
the  main  purpose  of  developing  this  scheme.  The 
complexity of the somewhat scheme was reduced by using 
additions and multiplications over integers instead of ideal 
lattices. Although one of the meaning of this scheme is that 
it  examined  out that  different mathematical  functions and 
theories  can  be  used  to  build  a  fully  homomorphic 
encryption scheme using Gentry’s blueprint. 
 
B.  Encryption  without  Bootstrapping  using  Fully 
Homomorphism  
 
Security:  The  security  of  this  scheme  is  based  on  the 
hardness  of  lattice  problems  with  quasi-polynomial 
estimation  components.  The attained  level  of  security  has 
not improved from original FHE scheme as it remains 2λ 
time against known lattice attacks. Because the scheme is 
comparatively  fresh,  it  is  likely  too  early  to  sustain  its 
security strength against different types of attacks with high 
assurance.  
Efficiency:  Brakerski  has  developed  a  novel  noise 
management technique that controlled the noise level so that 
it  increases  linearly  with  multiplication  instead  of 
exponential function. In a theoretical manner, this scheme 
measures  former  bootstrapping-based  FHE  schemes 
operation-wise.  This  scheme  also  permitted  for  L-level 
arithmetic  circuit  to  be  measured  with  Õ(λ.L3)  per-gate 
computation  or  rather  than  of  Ω(λ4)  which  is  a  large 
polynomial in the security parameter quantity. The removal 
of the bootstrapping technique has also resulted on real cost 
reduction as the cost of bootstrapping in only θ(λ) time was 
Ω(λ4).  From  this,  it  provides  us  for  measuring  deeper 
circuits  with  a  less  cost.  Applying  batching  and 
bootstrapping  as  optimization  techniques  can  achieve  a 
better per-gate computation of Õ(λ2) independent of number 
of levels.  
Complexity:  When  compared  to  FHE  over  Integers, 
Brakerski’s  scheme  applies  most  difficult  mathematical 
algorithms  and  notations  as  a  result  of  using  Ring  LWE 
instead of working with integers. However the removal of 
bootstrapping  technique  has  reduced  decryption  function 
and calculations. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
   Even though Dijk’s scheme has succeeded to reduce the 
complexity  of  Gentry’s  original  scheme,  his  scheme  has 
transmitted the efficiency limitations of the original scheme 
in term of disturbance, size of  cipher text and encryption 
keys, as well the time needed for encoding, decoding and 
evaluation functions. On the other hand Brakerski’s scheme 
introduced  new  novel  technique  for  noise  management 
which permitted for measuring deeper circuits with the same 
cost  as  earlier,  this  method  is  used  in  later  schemes  to 
improve  FHE  schemes  performance.  Both  schemes  have 
inspired many researchers to search for new mathematical 
approaches and techniques to improve the performance and 
efficiency while meeting the security requirements. At the 
moment the available schemes provide a great potential for 
cloud  computing  but  they  still  have  lots  of  scope  for 
improvement and enhancement before they can be ready for 
practical use in the cloud computing. 
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